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An “IDEA” to Consider

N

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a federal
spending program that assists school districts in educating students with
disabilities. To receive federal funding, school districts must educate
disabled students in the “ least restrictive environment” appropriate for
each child. This provision indicates a strong congressional preference to
educate students with disabilities in regular education classrooms. The
U.S. Supreme Court has yet to interpret the IDEA’s least restrictive
environment (LRE) mandate. Consequently, the federal circuit courts
employ different tests to assess whether a school district has satisfied the
LRE requirement. These divergent interpretations highlight the need to
implement a clear and uniform approach to evaluating states’ educational
placement decisions. This note first examines the history and purpose
underlying the IDEA’s requirements. Next, this note discusses the various
judicial tests used to evaluate school district compliance with the LRE
provision. This note contends that the courts should adopt the two-prong
test formulated by the Fifth Circuit because that framework best reflects
Congress’s intent and resolves the tension between the IDEA’s competing
mandates.
I.	INTRODUCTION

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a federal spending
program that assists school districts in educating disabled children.1 To receive federal
funds, school districts must provide disabled children with a “free appropriate public
education” in the “least restrictive environment.” 2 The IDEA’s least restrictive
environment (LRE) provision requires school districts to educate disabled students
with nondisabled students in the regular classroom to the greatest extent possible.3

1.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2013).

2.

Id. § 1412(a)(1), (5).

3.

Integrating students with disabilities into the regular education curriculum is commonly referred to as
“mainstreaming.” Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1989). However, in
the context of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the term “mainstreaming”
should not be treated as interchangeable with “inclusion.” Whereas inclusion connotes a normative
philosophical commitment to educating disabled students in the regular classroom, with or without use
of supplementary aids, the mainstreaming requirement underlying the least restrictive environment
(LRE) provision envisions a “continuum” of appropriate educational placements, rather than an
inclusion-exclusion dichotomy. See Susan C. Bon, Confronting the Special Education Inclusion Debate: A
Proposal to Adopt New State-Wide LRE Guidelines, 249 Educ. L. Rep. 1, 5–6 (2009) (“[T]he emphasis
on inclusion rather than LRE limits the range of placement options considered for meeting a child’s
educational needs. . . . As long as the least restrictive principle is perceived as interchangeable with
inclusion[,] . . . decisions about the appropriate placement are likely to cause conflict in school districts
and in the courts.”); see also Patrick Howard, The Least Restrictive Environment: How to Tell?, 33 J.L. &
Educ. 167, 169 (2004) (defining “mainstreaming” as “the philosophy that if [a disabled] student cannot
be educated in the general classroom, then the student should still spend as much time as possible
integrated into regular school day activities”).
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However, determining when it is appropriate to remove a disabled child from the
general classroom is a highly contested issue.4
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to interpret the IDEA’s LRE provision.5
Consequently, the lower federal courts employ different tests to determine whether a
school district has complied with the LRE requirement.6 This note contends that the
courts should adopt a uniform, nationwide standard for assessing school district
compliance with the LRE provision. Part II of this note discusses the IDEA and
examines the history and purpose underlying its LRE requirement. Part III presents
the differing judicial tests that the circuit courts have developed for determining
whether school districts’ educational placement decisions satisfy the LRE mandate.
Part IV argues that federal courts should adopt the two-prong test formulated by the
Fifth Circuit.
II.	THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT

Numerous disabled children have been denied educational opportunities
throughout our nation’s history:
In 1970, before enactment of the federal protections in IDEA, schools in
America educated only one in five students with disabilities. More than 1
million students were excluded from public schools, and another 3.5 million
did not receive appropriate services. Many states had laws excluding certain
students, including those who were blind, deaf, or labeled “emotionally
disturbed” or “mentally retarded.” Almost 200,000 school-age children with
mental retardation or emotional disabilities were institutionalized.7

As the civil rights movement seized the nation in the 1960s, the need for education
reform became glaringly clear.8 In response to the segregation and inadequate
4.

See generally Bon, supra note 3; see also Stacy Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA,
2006 BYU Educ. & L.J. 189, 190 (2006), available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol2006/
iss1/5 (“The debate over the education of students with disabilities continues to be a battle over
competing interests and priorities.”).

5.

In Board of Education v. Rowley, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the IDEA requires “educat[ing]
handicapped children with nonhandicapped children whenever possible.” 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982).
However, the Court “failed to provide a specific test or clear guidance to schools with respect to
decisions about LRE and the educational placement.” Bon, supra note 3, at 2.

6.

Bon, supra note 3, at 2–3 (“In response to parental challenges of school districts’ LRE placement
decisions, three distinct tests have emerged in the federal circuit courts.”).

7.

Nat’l Council on Disability, Back to School on Civil Rights 6 (2000), available at http://www.
ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/7bf b3c01_5c95_4d33_94b7_b80171d0b1bc?document.pdf. Notably,
disabled children “living in low-income, ethnic and racial minority, or rural communities” were more
susceptible to exclusion. Id. Today, the IDEA defines “mental retardation” as “significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested
during the developmental period, that adversely affects a child’s educational performance.” 34 C.F.R. §
300.8(c)(6) (2014).

8.

See Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964) (“The time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ has run
out, and that phrase can no longer justify denying . . . school children their constitutional rights to an
education equal to that afforded [to other students].”); see also Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
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education of disabled children, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA) in 1975,9 which was renamed “IDEA” in 1990.10 Since its
inception, the IDEA has created a multitude of educational opportunities for
previously excluded children.11
A. The Civil Rights Movement and Education Reform

The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education12 ultimately sparked
the desegregation of students with disabilities.13 Although the decision specifically
concerned segregation based on race, it highlighted the importance of providing an
equal education to all students—including students with disabilities.14 In the early
1970s, two monumental district court opinions seized on the Court’s holding in Brown
to prevent states from denying public education to disabled students.15
In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, parents
of thirteen intellectually disabled children brought a class action on behalf of all
intellectually disabled school-age students who had been excluded from Pennsylvania
public schools.16 These children were excluded because Pennsylvania law exempted the
state’s school districts from educating children who, on account of their mental
disability, were considered “uneducable and untrainable”17—a standard then defined by
the state’s Public School Code as having a mental age below five years of age.18
439 (1968) (“It is incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed plan promises
meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation.”).
9.

Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773.

10.

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103.

11.

Terry Jean Seligmann, An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons from Special Education Legislation, 29 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 759, 759 (2001).

12.

347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that racially segregated
schools were unconstitutional, finding that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” Id.
at 495.

13.

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, some lower courts sought to extend Brown’s
constitutional promise of equal education to disabled children. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.
Supp. 866, 874–75 (D.D.C. 1972) (relying partly on Brown to prohibit the categorical exclusion of
disabled children from public school education); see also Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania
(PARC), 343 F. Supp. 279, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

14.

“[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.” Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
Thus, while the Supreme Court’s holding in Brown was limited to racial segregation, its opinion spoke
in broad and neutral terms, on which some lower courts seized to extend Brown’s protections to disabled
children. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874–75; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 297.

15.

See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874–75; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 297.

16.

PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 281–82.

17.

Id. at 282 (citing 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 13-1375 (West 1965)).

18.

24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 13-1304. Section 1304 of the Pennsylvania Public School Code provided at the
time that “[t]he board of school directors may refuse to accept or retain beginners who have not attained
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Referencing the Court’s decision in Brown, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found
that the state could not exclude students from public school based on their disability19
and must at the very least provide a hearing before denying a disabled child a public
education.20 Significantly, the court also required the school district to presume that
“placement in a regular public school class is preferable to placement in a special public
school class and placement in a special public school class is preferable to placement in
any other type of program of education and training.”21 The decision ultimately
highlighted two policies: (1) disabled children are entitled to the same educational
opportunities as their nondisabled classmates; and (2) disabled children should be
educated in the regular classroom with their nondisabled peers whenever possible.22
In Mills v. Board of Education, school-age children brought a class action
challenging the D.C. Board of Education’s denial of public education to children
who were classified as intellectually disabled, hyperactive, or emotionally disturbed. 23
Similar to PARC, the Mills court referenced Brown’s rationale regarding racial
desegregation, 24 holding that the District of Columbia was required to educate
disabled children since the school district had undertaken to provide education to
those without disabilities.25
Although Mills and PARC were only binding in Pennsylvania and the District of
Columbia, they provided momentum for equal educational benefits to disabled
students.26 The principles established by these two decisions ultimately resulted in
the desegregation of students with disabilities in public schools, paving the way for a
legislative policy that would soon bring about significant education reform. 27

a mental age of five years, as determined by the supervisor of special education or a properly certificated
public school psychologist.” Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC), 334 F. Supp.
1257, 1260 (E.D. Pa. 1971), amended by 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
19.

PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 297.

20. Id. at 284–85.
21.

PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1260.

22.

See id.

23.

348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972).

24.

Id. at 874–75 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).

25.

Id.

26. As recognized by the Supreme Court in Rowley, “the principles which [Mills and PARC] established are

the principles which, to a significant extent, guided the drafters of the [Education of the Handicapped
Act].” Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 194 (1982).

27.

“[E]ncouraging access of handicapped students to public schools[,] [Mills and PARC] spurred Congress in
1974 to increase federal funding for existing programs and require, for the first time, that states adopt as
their goal to ‘provide full educational opportunities to all handicapped children.’” Heather J. Russell,
Florence County School District Four v. Carter: A Good “IDEA”; Suggestions for Implementing the Carter
Decision and Improving the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 1479, 1482 (1996)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88
Stat. 579, 580).
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B.	Statutory Developments: Education for All Handicapped Children Act and the IDEA

The pervasive practice of excluding disabled students from public school
education inspired immense congressional concern in the wake of the Mills and
PARC decisions. 28 As the judicial system embraced education reform, Congress
recognized that deficient state funds and failing initiatives were depriving disabled
children of meaningful educational opportunities, 29 and was thus concerned that a
majority of disabled children “were either totally excluded from schools or [were]
sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to
‘drop out.’”30 Consequently, Congress enacted the EAHCA in 1975. 31
In passing the EAHCA, Congress exhibited a strong federal commitment to
educating children with disabilities. 32 The EAHCA’s legislative history shows that
Congress intended through the collective efforts of federal, state, and local
government33 to extend equal education access to children with disabilities and, as a
result, the federal government increased funding for special education to assist school
districts in meeting their statutory and constitutional obligations.34
The EAHCA was renamed in 1990 as the IDEA 35 and was subsequently
amended in 1997.36 These amendments “both renewed the importance of the LRE
provision by providing that the regular classroom must be the default placement and

28. Congress became especially concerned with the fact that at least “1.75 million handicapped children

[were] receiving no educational services at all, and 2.5 million handicapped children [were] receiving an
inappropriate education.” S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432
[hereinafter Senate Report]; see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180–81 (defining the minimum educational
standard required under the IDEA).

29. See Senate Report, supra note 28, at 7 (“In recent years decisions in more than 36 court cases in the

States have recognized the rights of handicapped children to an appropriate education. States have made
an effort to comply; however, lack of financial resources [] prevented the implementation of the various
decisions which have been rendered.”).

30. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, at 2 (1975)).
31.

Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485 (1988 and Supp. V 1993)).

32.

Congress also hoped that, “[w]ith proper education services, many [intellectually disabled students]
would be able to become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced to remain
burdens.” Senate Report, supra note 28, at 9.

33.

Caryn Gelbman, Note, Suspensions and Expulsions Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act:
Victory for Handicapped Children or Defeat for School Officials?, 36 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 137,
142–43 (1989).

34. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, 775 (“[I]t is in

the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to
meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure equal protection of the law.”).

35.

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2013)).

36. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997)

(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482).
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emphasized the role of parent and student input into the decision-making process.”37
Notwithstanding these revisions, educating disabled students with their nondisabled
peers remained a core principle of the IDEA.38
C. The IDEA’s Requirements

The IDEA provides federal financial assistance to state and local agencies to
educate children with disabilities. 39 Covered disabilities include “intellectual
disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language
impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional
disturbance[,] . . . orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other
health impairments, or specific learning disabilities.”40 Federal grants to states under
the IDEA are divided into permissive and mandatory uses: funds may be used for
various “authorized activities,” such as professional development and training,
technological equipment, and mental health services;41 on the other hand, funds
must be used to monitor, enforce, and investigate complaints, as well as to implement
the IDEA’s mediation process.42
However, eligibility to receive financial assistance under the IDEA is contingent
on states: (1) providing disabled children with a “free appropriate public education,”43
(2) devising an “individualized education program,”44 and (3) educating disabled
children in the “least restrictive environment.”45
		

1. Free Appropriate Public Education

To qualify for federal financial assistance under the IDEA, a state must
demonstrate that its educational policy ensures that all disabled children have access

37.

Sarah E. Farley, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing Classroom Placement of Students with Disabilities
Under the IDEA, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 809, 817 (2002). In 2004, Congress amended and reauthorized the
IDEA as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA). 20 U.S.C. § 1400
(2004). Despite the IDEA’s reauthorization, the act is still commonly referred to as the “IDEA.” See
Laura Rothstein & Julia Irzyk, Disabilities and the Law § 1:2 (4th ed. 2014).

38. Integration is indeed the linchpin of the IDEA. The principle of integration is codified in the IDEA’s

LRE provision, under which children with disabilities must be educated with due regard to their special
needs, but in an environment that allows for the maximum possible interaction with their nondisabled
peers. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2013). To this end, the default placement for children with disabilities
is the regular classroom. 34 C.F.R. §300.114(a)(2) (2014).

39.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1411.

40. Id. § 1401(3)(A)(i).
41.

Id. § 1411(e)(2)(B)–(C).

42.

Id. § 1411(e)(2)(B).

43.

Id. § 1412(a)(1).

44. Id. § 1412(a)(4).
45.

Id. § 1412(a)(5).
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to a free appropriate public education.46 IDEA § 1401(9) defines “free appropriate
public education” as:
[S]pecial education and related services that—

(A)	have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;

(C)	include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school
education in the State involved; and

(D)	are provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section 1414(d) of this title.47

Section 1401(29) defines “special education” as:

[S]pecially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique
needs of a child with a disability, including—
(A)	instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and
institutions, and in other settings; and
(B) instruction in physical education.48

“Related services” are defined as “transportation, and such developmental, corrective,
and other supportive services . . . as may be required to assist a child with a disability
to benefit from special education.”49
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Board of Education v. Rowley shed light on the
free appropriate public education provision, explaining that “[i]mplicit in the
congressional purpose of providing access to a free appropriate public education is the
requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some
educational benefit upon the handicapped child.”50 Emphasizing that schools need
only provide a “basic floor of opportunity”51 to disabled students, the Court clarified
that an “appropriate education” does not mean “a potential-maximizing education.”52
Drawing from the statute’s text and legislative history, the Court posited a twopart test for assessing whether a school has provided a free appropriate public education.
First, a court must determine whether the state complied with the procedural
requirements of the IDEA.53 Second, the court must evaluate whether the IEP is
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.”54
46. Id. § 1412(a)(1).
47.

Id. § 1401(9).

48. Id. § 1401(29).
49. Id. § 1401(26) (including speech-language pathology and audiology services, psychological services,

physical and occupational therapy, counseling services, and social work services among others).

50. 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51.

Id. at 201.

52.

Id. at 197 n.21.

53.

Id. at 206.

54. Id. at 206–07.
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2. Individualized Education Program

		

3. Least Restrictive Environment

The IDEA requires the “development of an individualized educational program
(IEP) for each child that incorporates his or her special needs, so that the child may
benefit from the program offered.”55 An IEP is a written statement for each child
with a disability, which includes the child’s “present level of academic and functional
performance, measurable annual goals, special-education and supplemental services,
and any program modifications for the child, along with an explanation of the extent
to which the child will not participate with non-disabled children in regular classes
and activities.”56 Additionally, the start date, frequency, location, and duration of any
special supplementary services or modifications must be included in the IEP.57 The
“IEP Team,” which creates and revises the IEP,58 is comprised of the child’s parents,
the child’s regular education teacher, a special education teacher, a representative of
the local educational agency, and any other individuals who may be acquainted with
the child’s cognitive and mental capacities.59
In developing the IEP, the team must consider the child’s strengths, the parents’
concerns, the child’s most recent evaluation results, and the child’s academic,
developmental, and functional needs.60 In addition, the team must consider “special
factors” in specific circumstances, such as using behavioral interventions if the child
has behavioral problems or providing Braille instruction for children who are blind
or visually impaired.61 The team reviews the IEP at least once a year “to determine
whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved.”62 The IEP may be revised
“as appropriate” to address the child’s lack of progress or anticipated needs. 63
Importantly, the IDEA requires that the IEP enable a student with disabilities to
receive an education in the “least restrictive environment.”64
Federal funding is also contingent on ensuring that students with disabilities are
educated in the least restrictive environment.65 IDEA § 1412(a)(5)(A) states:

55.

Francis Amendola et al., 78A C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 967 (West 2015).

56. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2008).
57.

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII) (2013).

58. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
59.

See id.

60. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(A).
61.

Id. § 1414(d)(3)(B).

62. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i).
63. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii).
64. Id. § 1412(a)(5).
65.

Id. § 1412(a)(5)(B)(i)–(ii).
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To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including
children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated
with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or
other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a
child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary
aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.66

Thus, the IDEA requires schools to educate nondisabled students and disabled
students in an integrated setting to the maximum possible extent. Educating a
disabled student in a regular education classroom with nondisabled students is
commonly referred to as “mainstreaming.”67 A disabled student may only be removed
from the regular education environment and placed in a separate specialized
classroom or school if the student cannot be educated in regular classes with
supplemental aids and services at a satisfactory level.68
The Department of Education’s (DOE) regulations enforce the IDEA’s LRE
provision and offer guidance on the kinds of services and placements a school district
must provide.69 In addition to educating the disabled with their nondisabled peers
whenever possible, a school district “must ensure that a continuum of alternative
placements is available to meet the needs of children with disabilities for special
education and related services.” 70 The types of alternative placements range from
regular class instruction (the least restrictive) to special class instruction (more
restrictive) to hospital and institutional instruction (the most restrictive).71 If a
disabled child is educated in the regular classroom, the school district must provide
supplementary services such as resource rooms or itinerant instruction.72 Resource
rooms provide special instruction to disabled students in a small group or in an
individualized setting for a portion of the day.73 This type of service reinforces the
IDEA’s intent to maximize disabled students’ opportunity to be educated with their
peers.
Ultimately, the LRE requirement and DOE regulations ref lect a strong
congressional preference to educate disabled students alongside nondisabled students in
regular classrooms.74 However, the preference for mainstreaming must be balanced
against the IDEA’s primary goal of ensuring that public schools provide disabled
66. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
67.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

68. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
69. 34 C.F.R. § 300.114–.120 (2014).
70. Id. § 300.115(a).
71.

See id. § 300.115(b)(1).

72. Id. § 300.115(b)(2).
73. Sue Watson, What Is the Special Education Resource Room?, http://specialed.about.com/od/idea/a/

resourceroom.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).

74.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2013); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(i).
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children with a free appropriate public education.75 There is thus an inherent tension
between the IDEA requirement of a free appropriate public education and the IDEA
policy of educating disabled children in the regular classroom, since regular classes
generally do not provide a specifically tailored education for a disabled child’s individual
needs76 and, in some cases, special education is the only appropriate placement.77 For
these children, education in the regular classroom would fail to meet their unique and
specialized needs and would therefore prevent them from receiving the IDEA’s
mandated educational benefit—a free appropriate public education.78
Reconciling these two fundamental objectives is problematic in light of the act’s
lack of any substantive standards for striking the proper balance between its LRE
mandate and its free appropriate public education requirement. “This tension invokes
the choice between specialized services and some degree of separate treatment on the
one side and minimized labeling and minimized segregation on the other.” 79
Moreover, the Supreme Court has yet to interpret the IDEA’s LRE provision—
which has led to a three-way circuit split among the lower federal courts over the
proper criteria to consider in evaluating state compliance with the LRE requirement.80
D. Procedural Safeguards

The IDEA affords disabled children and their parents procedural safeguards in
the event that a dispute arises between the parents and the school district. If a child’s
IEP or educational placement is changed, the child’s parents must be notified.81 The
parents may file a complaint with a designated state agency if they disagree with
their child’s IEP or educational placement,82 and an “impartial due process hearing”
will be held.83 Either party may appeal the hearing officer’s decision in a “[s]tate
court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States.”84
75. Amendola et al., supra note 55, § 998.
76. See, e.g., Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044–45 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he [IDEA]’s

mandate for a free appropriate public education qualifies and limits its mandate for education in the
regular classroom.”); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 695 (11th Cir. 1991); Oberti v. Bd.
of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he apparent tension within the [IDEA] between the
strong preference for mainstreaming, and the requirement that schools provide individualized programs
tailored to the specific needs of each disabled child.” (citations omitted)).

77.

See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1044 (“The nature or severity of some children’s handicaps is such that only
special education can address their needs.”).

78. See id.
79. Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 Law

& Contemp. Probs. 157, 181 (1985); see also Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1045.

80. See discussion infra Part III.
81.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2013).

82. Id. § 1415(b)(6).
83. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A).
84. Id. § 1415(i)(1)–(2), (g).
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These procedural safeguards have opened the gates to the courthouse.85 Litigation
over a disabled child’s educational placement has become a controversial issue and
will continue to be so until the federal courts adopt a clear and uniform interpretation
of the LRE provision.86
III.	DIFFERING JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DETERMINING COMPLIANCE WITH THE
LRE MANDATE

Determining whether a state has educated a disabled student in the least restrictive
environment to the maximum extent appropriate is controversial, due in large part to
the lack of Supreme Court guidance.87 As a result, there is currently a three-way circuit
split over which test to apply when evaluating state compliance with the LRE mandate.
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits apply a three-factor test, which focuses on the
feasibility of providing special services in a regular classroom setting.88 In contrast, the
Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits employ a two-prong test that
mimics the statute’s text and turns on “the school’s proper use of supplementary aids
and services, which may enable the school to educate a child with disabilities for a
majority of the time within a regular classroom, while at the same time addressing that
child’s unique educational needs.”89 Refusing to adopt either of these approaches, the
Ninth Circuit devised its own four-factor balancing test.90
A. The Three-Factor Feasibility Test

In 1983, the Sixth Circuit was the first to establish the three-factor feasibility
test to inform school district decisions in determining the appropriate placement for
children with disabilities;91 the test was subsequently adopted by the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits.92
85. See Patricia A. Massey & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Matters: Toward a Law School Clinical

Model for Serving Youth with Special Education Needs, 11 Clinical L. Rev. 271, 277–78 (2005)
(describing the various types of IDEA violations on the basis of which parents of disabled children file
compliance complaints).

86. See Bon, supra note 3, at 3 (arguing that the “adoption of clear state-wide LRE guidelines” would

alleviate “the educational, financial, and emotional strains that are placed on parents and educators
when special education litigation reaches the courts”).

87.

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

88. See DeVries v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d

158 (8th Cir. 1987); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983).

89. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2008); L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist.,
379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991); Daniel
R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).

90. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting the

district court’s four-factor balancing test).

91.

See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.

92.

See DeVries, 882 F.2d at 878–79; A.W., 813 F.2d at 163–64.
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1. Established by the Sixth Circuit

Neill Roncker was a nine-year-old boy with severe intellectual disability.93 He
also suffered from seizures and required constant supervision due to his inability to
identify dangerous situations.94 In 1976, Neill attended the Arlitt Child Development
Center, where he had contact with nondisabled children—contact from which he
was believed to benefit.95 In 1979, Neill’s parents, school psychologists, and a member
of the Hamilton County Board of Mental Retardation held a conference to evaluate
Neill’s IEP as required by the IDEA.96 The evaluation resulted in the school district’s
decision to place Neill in a school exclusively for the disabled where Neill would have
no interaction with nondisabled children.97 Refusing to accept the placement, the
Ronckers sought a due process hearing.98 The impartial hearing officer determined
that the school district failed to establish that placing Neill in a school exclusively for
children with disabilities afforded the maximum appropriate contact with nondisabled
children, as required by the IDEA’s LRE provision.99
The school district appealed to the Ohio State Board of Education, which agreed
that Neill would benefit from placement in a specialized school, but reasoned that
Neill should also be afforded contact with nondisabled children “during lunch, recess
and transportation to and from school.”100 However, the board did not explain how
to implement this “split program.”101
The Ronckers subsequently filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, alleging that Neill “could be provided the special instruction he
needed in a setting where he could have contact with non-handicapped children.”102
During the pendency of the litigation, Neill attended a regular public school and
interacted with nondisabled students during lunch, gym, and recess.103 The school
district asserted that the educational benefits of placing Neill at a special facility
outweighed the marginal benefits he would gain from attending a regular public
school.104 Finding that Neill did not make any significant progress while attending

93.

Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1060.

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97.

Id.

98. Id. at 1061.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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the regular public school, the district court upheld Neill’s placement in the school for
intellectually disabled children.105
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the school district complied
with the LRE mandate.106 Distinguishing the Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley,
the Sixth Circuit noted that Rowley failed to address the LRE provision,107 setting
forth the first standard for determining whether a disabled child’s educational
placement satisfies the LRE requirement of educating disabled children with
nondisabled children to the maximum extent appropriate. The court noted:
In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should
determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be
feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in the
segregated school would be inappropriate under the [IDEA]. Framing the issue
in this manner accords the proper respect for the strong preference in favor of
mainstreaming while still realizing the possibility that some handicapped
children simply must be educated in segregated facilities either because the
handicapped child would not benefit from mainstreaming, because any
marginal benefits received from mainstreaming are far outweighed by the
benefits gained from services which could not feasibly be provided in the nonsegregated setting, or because the handicapped child is a disruptive force in the
non-segregated setting. Cost is a proper factor to consider since excessive
spending on one handicapped child deprives other handicapped children.108

Under this framework, the initial inquiry is whether it is feasible to provide
additional services in a regular setting that satisfy the disabled child’s educational,
physical, and emotional needs.109 If so, the school district should assess the following
three factors: (1) whether the benefits of educating the student in the regular
classroom outweigh the benefits of placing the child in a special education classroom
(which provides services that cannot be provided in a non-segregated setting);
(2) whether the disabled child is disruptive in the regular setting (e.g., the child
distracts other students or requires excessive supervision); and (3) whether the cost of
placing the child in the regular classroom requires excessive resources (such that
other disabled students would be deprived of essential resources).110
The court explained that framing the analysis in this manner promotes Congress’s
preference for mainstreaming, yet acknowledges that a regular setting is inappropriate

105. Id.
106. Id. at 1062.
107. Id. at 1062 (“[T]his case involves the mainstreaming provision of the [IDEA] while Rowley involved a

choice between two methods for educating a deaf student.”).

108. Id. at 1063.
109. See id.
110. See id. Although cost is an appropriate consideration, it is not a defense “if the school district has failed

to use its funds to provide a proper continuum of alternative placements for handicapped children. The
provision of such alternative placements benefits all handicapped children.” Id.
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for some disabled students.111 The case was consequently remanded back to the
district court to determine “whether Neill’s educational, physical or emotional needs
require some service which could not feasibly be provided in a class for handicapped
children within a regular school or in the type of split program advocated by the
State Board of Education.”112
		

2. Adopted by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits

In A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School District, the Eighth Circuit endorsed the Sixth
Circuit’s feasibility test.113 The court focused on the third factor identified in
Roncker—the cost of educating a child with severe disabilities in the regular
classroom.114 The court emphasized that the LRE requirement must be viewed in
light of the reality of limited public funds.115 Affirming the district court’s decision,
the Eighth Circuit held that it was permitted “to consider both cost to the local
school district and benefit to the child” from placement in regular school.116
The Fourth Circuit also adopted the Sixth Circuit’s feasibility test in DeVries v.
Fairfax County School Board.117 The court contemplated the benefits of educating a
seventeen-year-old autistic student in the regular classroom, and whether those
benefits substantially outweighed the benefits of placing the child in a segregated
vocational center located in a regular high school campus.118 Finding that he would
“glean little from the lectures,” perform at a lower level, and barely communicate even
with an aide’s assistance, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision to place the child in
the vocational school rather than the regular public high school.119
B. The Two-Prong Test

Declining to follow the Sixth Circuit’s approach, the Fifth Circuit formulated its
own test for evaluating school district compliance with the LRE requirement.120 The
standard espoused by the Fifth Circuit is currently the most prevailing test among
the circuit courts.121 While only three circuits follow the three-factor feasibility test,
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 813 F.2d 158, 163–64 (8th Cir. 1987).
114. Id. at 163.
115. Id. at 164.
116. Id. at 163.
117. 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989).
118. Id. at 877.
119. Id. at 879–80.
120. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
121. See P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2008); L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966

(10th Cir. 2004); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist.,
950 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991).
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five circuits have adopted the two-prong test over the span of nineteen years—the
most recent being the Second Circuit in 2008.122
		

1. Established by the Fifth Circuit

Six years after Roncker was decided, the Fifth Circuit confronted the issue of
school district compliance with the IDEA’s mainstreaming requirement.123 In Daniel
R.R. v. Board of Education, the Fifth Circuit declined to follow the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis in Roncker and instead devised its own two-prong test.124 Daniel suffered
from Downs Syndrome;125 although Daniel was six-years-old, he possessed
communication skills of a two-year-old and had a developmental age of a two- to
three-year-old.126 When Daniel attended a regular pre-kindergarten class, the
teacher had to alter her teaching methods and modify the curriculum.127 However,
Daniel still required constant individual attention and could not master basic skills.128
Consequently, the school district’s Admission, Review and Dismissal Committee
decided that pre-kindergarten was inappropriate for Daniel and accordingly changed
his placement.129 Under the new placement, Daniel would attend the special
education pre-kindergarten class, eat lunch with nondisabled students three days
each week, and interact with nondisabled students during recess.130 Arguing that the
Committee “improperly shut the door to regular education for Daniel,” Daniel’s
parents appealed to an impartial hearing officer who affirmed the Committee’s
decision.131 Daniel’s parents subsequently filed an action in the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Texas, alleging that Daniel’s new placement violated the
LRE provision;132 however, the court upheld the Committee’s decision.133
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Roncker test, claiming that the Sixth
Circuit’s feasibility standard encroaches upon state and local school officials’
delegated authority.134 The court reasoned that educational policy choices, such as
determining the feasibility of providing a particular service in a regular or special
122. See cases cited supra note 121.
123. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d 1036.
124. Id. at 1046–48.
125. Id. at 1039.
126. Id.
127. Id. (“Modifying the Pre-kindergarten curriculum and her teaching methods sufficiently to reach Daniel

would have required [the schoolteacher] to modify the curriculum almost beyond recognition.”).

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1040.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1046.
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education setting, are deliberately left to state and local school authorities whose
expertise in the field counsels against second-guessing by the courts.135 Moreover,
the court criticized the Roncker test because it barely referenced the language of the
statute,136 contending that the proper standard for evaluating compliance with the
mainstreaming requirement should instead mimic the statutory text.137
Adhering to the text of the statute, the Fifth Circuit set forth a two-prong test
for determining compliance with the mainstreaming requirement.138 First, the court
must determine “whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of
supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily.” 139 If appropriate
education cannot be achieved satisfactorily in the regular classroom, and specialized
placement is therefore necessary, the court must then determine “whether the school
has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate.”140
Compliance with the mainstreaming requirement is determined on a case-bycase basis. Courts consider the following factors when applying the first prong of the
Fifth Circuit test: (1) the efforts the school district has made to accommodate the
child in the regular classroom (such as modifying the regular curriculum or providing
teacher aides); (2) the educational benefits the child receives from regular education;
(3) the overall educational experience the child has in a regular education environment
(such as learning language and behavior skills from nondisabled students); and
(4) the effect the disabled child’s presence has on the regular classroom (such as
being disruptive to other students or burdensome to the instructor).141 Under this
framework, “no single factor is dispositive.”142
Upon analyzing these factors as a whole, the court concluded that the school
district could not educate Daniel satisfactorily in the regular education classroom.143
First, the court evaluated the steps the school district had taken to accommodate
Daniel in the regular classroom.144 Daniel’s pre-kindergarten teacher had made
substantial efforts to modify the pre-kindergarten curriculum but, unfortunately,
those efforts yielded minimal benefits for Daniel.145 The court explained that states
need not “provide every conceivable supplementary aid or service to assist the
135. Id. (contending that the Roncker test “necessitates too intrusive an inquiry into the educational policy

choices that Congress deliberately left to state and local school officials”).

136. Id.
137. See id. at 1048.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1048–49.
142. Id. at 1048.
143. Id. at 1051.
144. Id. at 1050.
145. Id.
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[disabled] child.”146 Regular education instructors are neither required “to devote all
or most of their time to one handicapped child” nor should they “modify the regular
education program beyond recognition.”147 Tailoring the curriculum to Daniel’s
needs would have required a ninety to one hundred percent modification—an effort
that mainstreaming does not require.148 Thus, the court found that the school district
had taken sufficient steps to accommodate Daniel.149
Second, the court considered the educational benefits that Daniel received from
regular education. This factor focuses “on the student’s ability to grasp the essential
elements of the regular education curriculum.”150 In light of Daniel’s disability, which
had severely impeded his developmental capabilities, and considering the prekindergarten curriculum’s focus on developmental skills, Daniel could not master the
class’s basic lessons.151 The court concluded that interacting with nondisabled students
was the only benefit Daniel received from regular education.152 While conceding that
“academic achievement is not the only purpose of mainstreaming,” the court concluded
that specialized education was the more appropriate placement.153
The third factor contemplates the benefits a disabled child may receive from nonacademic experiences in the regular education environment—for instance, whether the
overall regular education experience offers beneficial language and behavior models
through interaction with nondisabled students.154 These models may enhance a disabled
child’s ability to develop social and communication skills.155 Thus, mainstreaming may
be favored when a child benefits from the interaction with nondisabled students, despite
the child’s inability to excel academically. In contrast, mainstreaming is not desirable if
regular education fails to address the child’s unique educational needs.156 In Daniel R.R.,
the court found the exhausting and strenuous nature of the regular education program
to be detrimental to Daniel, as it caused him to fall asleep at school and develop a

146. Id. at 1048.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1050.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1049.
151. Id. at 1050.
152. Id. at 1051 (“[T]he only value of regular education for Daniel is the interaction which he has with

nonhandicapped students.”).

153. Id. at 1049, 1051.
154. See id. at 1049 (“[A] child may be able to absorb only a minimal amount of the regular education

program, but may benefit enormously from the language models that his nonhandicapped peers provide
for him.”).

155. See id. at 1047–48 (“[M]ainstreaming may have benefits in and of itself. For example, the language and

behavior models available from nonhandicapped children may be essential or helpful to the handicapped
child’s development.”).

156. Id. at 1049.
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stutter.157 When balanced against the benefits of special education (an environment in
which Daniel was making progress), the court found that the opportunity for Daniel
to interact with nondisabled students did not warrant mainstreaming.158
Finally, courts consider whether the child’s presence in the regular classroom is
disruptive to other students or burdensome on the teacher. Mainstreaming is not
required when a disabled child’s disruptive behavior impairs the education of other
students or when a child requires “so much of the instructor’s attention that the
instructor will have to ignore the other student’s needs in order to tend to the
handicapped child.”159 Although a teaching assistant may be able to “minimize the
burden on the teacher,” if the disabled child “requires so much of the teacher or the
aide’s time that the rest of the class suffers, then the balance will tip in favor of
placing the child in special education.”160 In Daniel R.R., the court found that
Daniel’s presence in regular pre-kindergarten was unfair to the rest of the class, as he
required all or most of the teacher’s attention.161
Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that the factors—individually and in
the aggregate—tipped the scale in favor of placing Daniel in special education and
suggested that the school district could not educate Daniel satisfactorily in the
regular education classroom.162
Accordingly, the court applied the test’s second prong, which evaluates whether
the school district mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate.163 To
satisfy the second prong, “the school must take intermediate steps where appropriate,
such as placing the child in regular education for some academic classes and in
special education for others, mainstreaming the child for nonacademic classes only,
or providing interaction with nonhandicapped children during lunch and recess.”164
In Daniel R.R., the school district mainstreamed Daniel for lunch and recess.165 The
court found that this intermediate step of mainstreaming satisfied the LRE
provision.166 Consequently, the court held that the school district had complied with
the mainstreaming requirement since (1) education in the regular classroom, even
with the use of supplementary aids and services, could not be achieved satisfactorily,
and (2) the school district’s specialized placement enabled Daniel to interact with
nondisabled students to the maximum extent appropriate.167
157. Id. at 1051.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1049.
160. Id. at 1049–50.
161. Id. at 1051.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1050–51.
164. Id. at 1050 (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 1039.
166. Id. at 1051.
167. Id.

671

An “IDEA” to Consider

		

N

2. Adopted by the Second, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits

Four circuits have adopted the two-prong test since the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Daniel R.R.168 In Greer v. Rome City School District, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the
Fifth Circuit’s two-prong test, emphasizing the importance of considering the “full
range of supplemental aids and services, including resource rooms and itinerant
instruction, that could be provided to assist [the disabled child] in the regular
classroom.”169 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the two-prong test “adheres so closely
to the language of the [IDEA] and, therefore, clearly reflects Congressional intent.”170
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Oberti v. Board of Education adopted the twoprong test to determine whether the school district satisfied the LRE mandate.171
Building on the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Greer, the court identified the vast
range of supplemental aids and services that schools must consider, such as “speech
and language therapy, special education training for the regular teacher, behavior
modification programs, or any other available aids or services appropriate to the
child’s particular disabilities.”172
In 2004, the Tenth Circuit followed suit and embraced the two-prong test173 and,
four years later, the Second Circuit did the same in P. v. Newington Board of Education.174
C. The Four-Factor Balancing Test

The Ninth Circuit devised its own four-factor balancing test to determine
whether a school district’s placement decision violates the LRE provision,175 and is
the only circuit court to employ this test.
		

1. Established by the Ninth Circuit

In 1994, the Ninth Circuit formulated a new standard for gaging compliance
with the LRE requirement—a standard which derives some of its elements from
both the Roncker feasibility test and Daniel R.R.’s two-prong test.176 Rachel Holland
168. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2008); L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966 (10th

Cir. 2004); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950
F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991).

169. 950 F.2d at 698.
170. Id. at 696.
171. See 995 F.2d at 1215.
172. Id. at 1216.
173. See Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d at 977 (“[T]his court is persuaded by the Daniel R.R. test and by the

reasoning of the other circuits which have adopted it.”).

174. 546 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he two-pronged approach adopted by the Third, Fifth,

Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits provides appropriate guidance to the district courts without ‘too
intrusive an inquiry into the educational policy choices that Congress deliberately left to state and local
school officials.’” (quoting Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989))).

175. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
176. See id. at 1404.
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was a moderately intellectually disabled eleven-year-old.177 While Rachel’s parents
wanted her to be placed full-time in a regular classroom, the school district rejected
their request.178 Instead, the school district “proposed a placement that would have
divided Rachel’s time between a special education class for academic subjects and a
regular class for non-academic activities such as art, music, lunch, and recess.”179
Rachel’s parents appealed the school district’s decision to an impartial hearing
officer.180 Finding that the school district did not make sufficient efforts to educate
Rachel in a regular class pursuant to the LRE mandate, the impartial hearing officer
ordered the school district “to place Rachel in a regular classroom with support
services, including a special education consultant and a part-time aide.”181 The school
district appealed the decision to the district court.182
In determining whether the school district’s proposed educational placement
complied with the LRE provision, the district court evaluated the following four
factors:
(1) the educational benefits available to Rachel in a regular classroom,
supplemented with appropriate aids and services, as compared with the
educational benefits of a special education classroom; (2) the non-academic
benefits of interaction with children who were not disabled; (3) the effect of
Rachel’s presence on the teacher and other children in the classroom; and
(4) the cost of mainstreaming Rachel in a regular classroom.183

Applying this framework, the district court found that: (1) Rachel received
substantial educational benefits in a regular classroom “with some modification to the
curriculum and with the assistance of a part-time aide”;184 (2) Rachel developed her
social skills and gained self-confidence from placement in a regular classroom;
(3) “Rachel followed directions and was well-behaved and not a distraction in class”;185
and (4) the school district failed to satisfy its burden of proving that “educating Rachel
in a regular classroom with appropriate services would be significantly more expensive
than educating her in the District’s proposed setting.”186 Since each of the four factors
weighed in favor of mainstreaming Rachel, the district court “concluded that the

177. Id. at 1400.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1400–01.
184. Id. at 1401.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1401–02.

673

An “IDEA” to Consider

N

appropriate placement for Rachel was full-time in a regular second grade classroom
with some supplemental services.”187
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit adopted wholesale the district court’s balancing
test.188 To date, no other circuit court has adopted this four-factor balancing test.
IV.	A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO ADOPT THE TWO-PRONG TEST USED BY A
MAJORITY OF CIRCUIT COURTS

The Supreme Court’s silence has triggered a three-way circuit split over the proper
standard for assessing school district compliance with the IDEA’s LRE requirement.189
In turn, the differing judicial approaches have produced disparate outcomes for special
education students across the nation.190 Fashioning a solution that helps (and is well
suited to) the wide range of students with disabilities poses a great challenge. But the
lack of clear and uniform guidelines amid the lower courts’ divergent interpretations
highlights the need to devise a clear, uniform, and nationwide approach to evaluating
educational placement decisions under the LRE provision.191
The two-prong test formulated by the Fifth Circuit in Daniel R.R. is currently the
most widely adopted framework among the circuit courts. The two-prong test is also
the most workable and most appropriate standard for three reasons: (1) it best reflects
congressional intent; (2) it resolves the tension between the IDEA’s free appropriate
public education requirement and its LRE mandate; and (3) it comports best with
notions of federalism and the states’ traditional authority over educational policy.
A. The Two-Prong Test Better Reflects Congressional Intent

The two-prong test asks: (1) “whether the child can be educated satisfactorily in
a regular classroom with supplemental aids and services”;192 and (2) “whether the
school has included the child in school programs with nondisabled children to the
maximum extent appropriate.”193 By tracing the language of the statute, this twostep approach fully effectuates the congressional intent behind the LRE provision.
For instance, the first prong is reflected in the LRE provision, which prohibits
school districts from taking a disabled child out of the regular classroom unless “the
nature or severity of the disability . . . is such that education in regular classes with
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”194
187. Id. at 1402.
188. Id. at 1404.
189. Farley, supra note 37, at 818–19.
190. See id. at 831 (“Application of the varying tests for determining compliance with the LRE provision

leads to potential disparity in outcomes, depending solely on geographic location. Such disparity could
be avoided with the adoption of a single, nationwide test.”).

191. See id. at 819, 832.
192. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215–16 (3d Cir. 1993).
193. Id. at 1218 (citing Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048, 1050 (5th Cir. 1989)).
194. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2013).
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Furthermore, the factors used to evaluate whether the first prong has been met—
(1) the steps taken to accommodate the disabled child in the regular classroom,
(2) the educational benefits from regular education, (3) the overall educational
experience, and (4) the effect of the disabled child’s presence on the regular classroom
environment195—clearly reflect Congress’s intent to enhance disabled students’ access
to the regular classroom and to educate them along with their nondisabled peers.196
Additionally, the second prong closely follows the IDEA’s language as it
contemplates whether the child has received an education with nondisabled children
to the maximum extent appropriate.197 Further, unlike the other two tests, the Fifth
Circuit two-prong test allows courts to assess under the first prong which factors are
relevant based on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.198 Thus, in
addition to better reflecting congressional intent, the Fifth Circuit’s two-part test
allows for much needed flexibility under the first prong’s case‑by‑case approach.199
Finally, unlike the other two tests, the Fifth Circuit’s f lexible framework
recognizes the non-academic benefits f lowing from a desegregated education. 200
There are inherent, non-academic benefits in maintaining disabled students in an
integrated environment, namely “social interaction” and regular “communication”
with nondisabled students.201 The benefits of inclusion are reciprocal because it also
teaches nondisabled students how to interact and communicate with their disabled
peers.202 Considering the reciprocal non-academic benefits of integration is essential
for achieving Congress’s objective in passing the IDEA, as one principal purpose of
195. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048–49.
196. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); see also Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216 (emphasizing that a school will likely

violate the LRE’s mainstreaming directive if it fails to modify or supplement the regular education
curriculum in order to accommodate a disabled child).

197. Compare Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050 (stating that schools fulfill their obligations under the IDEA if

they “have provided [students with disabilities with] the maximum appropriate exposure to nonhandicapped students”), with 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (requiring schools to educate children with
disabilities alongside nondisabled children “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate”); see also Oberti, 995
F.2d at 1215 (“We think this two-part test, which closely tracks the language of [the LRE provision], is
faithful to the IDEA’s directive that children with disabilities be educated with nondisabled children ‘to
the maximum extent appropriate.’” (quoting § 1412(a)(5)(A)); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d
688, 696 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Because this test adheres so closely to the language of the [IDEA] and,
therefore, clearly reflects Congressional intent, we adopt it.”).

198. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048–49; see also Beth B. v. Van Clay, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1031 (N.D. Ill.

2001) (“[W]e agree with the Fifth Circuit that the factors must be case-specific. Daniel R.R. draws on
the statutory language to set a general framework—a test—and then examines several factors in its
application of that test.”).

199. Farley, supra note 37, at 834–35.
200. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049 (“[A]cademic achievement is not the only purpose of mainstreaming.”);

see also Greer, 950 F.2d at 697 (“Integrating a handicapped child into a nonhandicapped environment
may be beneficial in and of itself.” (quoting Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049)).

201. Farley, supra note 37, at 838.
202. See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217 n.24.
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N

the act was to address and remedy the social harm wrought by segregated educational
facilities.203
Based on the foregoing, the Fifth Circuit two-prong test promotes best the intent
underlying the LRE provision.
B. The Two-Prong Test Resolves the Tension Between the IDEA’s Conflicting Mandates

The school’s use of supplementary aids and services is foundational to striking
the proper balance between the IDEA’s commitment to provide a free appropriate
public education and its preference for educating students in the least restrictive
environment. Providing additional services to disabled students enables the school to
simultaneously educate them in the regular classroom while addressing their
individual education needs. 204 Therefore, the two-prong framework, unlike the
feasibility test, strikes the proper balance between educating disabled students in the
regular classroom and ensuring a free appropriate public education for all. 205
The Fifth Circuit’s two-part framework consists of two separate inquiries:
(1) would the disabled student receive a satisfactory education in the regular classroom
by way of supplementary aids and services; and (2) if the first question yields a negative
answer—i.e., if a more segregated environment would better serve the student’s unique
educational needs—then the question turns on whether the school’s specialized
placement mainstreams the child to the maximum extent possible (for example, by
enabling interaction with nonhandicapped students during lunch, recess, and other
non-academic activities). The first prong adheres to congressional intent by making
placement in the regular classroom the default educational setting, as required by the
LRE provision.206 More importantly, the test’s second prong recognizes that regular
classroom placement is not a one-size-fits-all solution, especially considering Congress’s
command that all disabled children receive a free appropriate public education.207
However, even when a more segregated educational placement is warranted, the second
prong demands that the school district take steps to mainstream the student to the
maximum extent possible.208 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit’s two-part framework
resolves the tension (and strikes the proper balance) between the IDEA’s competing
mandates: integration and satisfactory education.
203. See discussion supra Part II.
204. See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1215.
205. The Ninth Circuit’s four-factor balancing test is flexible in nature and would thus, in theory, allow

courts to strike a sensible balance between the IDEA’s seemingly conflicting mandates. However, the
test provides no guidance as to the relative weight to be accorded each of its four factors. See Sacramento
City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). This inevitably leads to
inconsistent and arbitrary placement determinations. See, e.g., Poolaw v. Bishop, 67 F.3d 830, 836–37
(9th Cir. 1995) (finding two factors militating in favor of regular classroom placement and two against,
yet upholding the school’s restrictive placement).

206. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2013).
207. Id. § 1412(a)(1).
208. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.117 (2014).
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C. The Two-Prong Test Best Comports with Principles of Federalism

Education has always been an area of state regulation. And educational policy is
one of the few spheres of authority that have been traditionally recognized as
exclusively committed to the states.209 In recent years, the federal government has
employed its spending power to incentivize states to adopt or modify educational
policy goals as applied to discrete segments of the student population.210 However,
even under conditional spending programs such as the IDEA, courts must remain
careful not to impute to Congress an intent of upsetting the federalism status quo
and, specifically, the states’ traditional authority over their own educational policy. 211
While the Supreme Court has yet to address the IDEA’s mainstreaming requirement,
the Rowley Court did warn the lower courts not “to substitute their own notions of
sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” 212
Thus, while federal courts have a duty to ensure that recipient states comply with the
IDEA’s substantive standards, they may not “impose substantive standards of review
which cannot be derived from the Act itself.”213
The Fifth Circuit’s two-part framework heeds the Supreme Court’s warning in
Rowley because, unlike the feasibility test, it does not excessively intrude “into the
educational policy choices that Congress deliberately left to state and local school
officials.”214 Rather, by closely tracking the language of the IDEA, the two-prong test
guarantees that courts would not meddle with the states’ educational policy, except
insofar as Congress has provided.215 The feasibility test, by contrast, is “too intrusive
an inquiry”216 into the states’ educational policy judgments because it fails to accord
local school officials the deference that difficult educational policy questions ought to
209. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public education in our Nation is

committed to the control of state and local authorities.”). “Traditionally, policymakers have supported
state and local control rather than federal directives and federal education legislation has normally
contained strong prohibitions against federal control of education.” Gail L. Sunderman & Jimmy
Kim, Expansion of Federal Power in American Education: Federal-State Relationships
Under the No Child Left Behind Act, Year One 4 (The Civil Rights Project at Harvard Univ.
eds., 2004).

210. Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56 Emory L.J. 125, 127 (2006).
211. See generally John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 399

(2010).

212. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). “It is clear that Congress was aware of the States’

traditional role in the formulation and execution of educational policy. ‘Historically, the States have had
the primary responsibility for the education of children at the elementary and secondary level.’” Id. at
208 n.30 (quoting 121 Cong. Rec. 19,498 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Dole)).

213. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206 (holding that IDEA § 1415(e)’s directive that “the reviewing court ‘receive the

records of the [state] administrative proceedings’ carries with it the implied requirement that due weight
shall be given to these proceedings” (alteration in original)).

214. Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989).
215. See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Farley, supra note 37, at 834.
216. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1046.
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receive.217 Therefore, the feasibility test runs counter to the deferential stance the
Supreme Court has mandated when reviewing school districts’ placement decisions
under the IDEA.218
Similarly, by requiring states to prove that mainstream education “would be
significantly more expensive than [placement in a specialized program],”219 the Ninth
Circuit’s four-factor balancing test entails the same sort of second-guessing of state
educational policies that Rowley warns against.220 Thus, it is clear that the Fifth
Circuit two-prong test is the most comprehensive, effective approach—consistent
with federalism principles—to evaluating educational placement decisions.
V. CONCLUSION

By enacting the IDEA, Congress sought to rectify the pervasive practice of denying
students with disabilities access to publicly funded education. 221 The act’s LRE
provision ultimately reflects the congressional intent to educate disabled children in the
regular classroom to the maximum extent appropriate for each child’s particular needs.
Unfortunately, discerning congressional intent has produced multiple interpretations,
partly due to the Supreme Court’s silence on the standard by which to determine state
compliance with the LRE provision.
As this note has explained, the two-prong test espoused by the Fifth Circuit—and
subsequently adopted by four other circuits—should be uniformly adopted. As the
most widely accepted standard among the circuit courts, the trend in case law reveals
that this framework best reflects Congress’s intent in passing the IDEA and resolves
the tension between the IDEA’s seemingly conflicting mandates. Importantly, the
two-part framework ensures school district compliance with the LRE provision
without unnecessarily encroaching on the states’ traditional authority over educational
policy. Implementing a clear nationwide approach, such as the two-prong framework,
would ensure equal educational access to students with disabilities while eliminating
disparate educational placements across the nation—just as Congress intended.

217. See P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]hile our review is de novo, it

is tinged with a significant degree of deference to the state educational agency, as we are essentially
acting in an administrative-law-style capacity.”).

218. “The very importance which Congress has attached to compliance with [IDEA procedures] . . . would

be frustrated if a court were permitted simply to set state decisions at nought.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.

219. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1401–02 (9th Cir. 1994).
220. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see also L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 977 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[The

Fifth Circuit’s framework] acknowledge[s] the fiscal reality that school districts with limited resources
must balance the needs of each disabled child with the needs of other children in the district.” (emphasis
added)).

221. See discussion supra Part II.
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